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Abstract
In a nearly paradoxical manner, the virtue of martial courage is best understood through violent acts 
that are typically vicious, such as killing, maiming, and bombing. To ameliorate this worry, I make a new 
distinction that is dependent on whether the agent acts in accord with social norms (social courage) or 
against them (oppositional courage). We usually understand martial courage through social courage, where 
soldiers are courageous through performing violent acts that society determines are necessary. While this 
understanding is accurate for a just war, violence cannot be virtuous when fighting for an unjust cause. 
The oppositional form of martial courage involves acting contrary to social norms by refusing to fight on 
behalf of an unjust cause or in unjust ways. As a virtue, martial courage should include bravely renouncing 
and resisting unjust wars. In this way, oppositional courage provides a non-violent grounding for martial 
courage: while martial courage often requires violence, it also requires a vigilant readiness to refuse to be 
violent when justice requires oppositional courage. 
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Introduction 
It is somewhat troubling that many of the paradigm examples for the virtue of courage 
involve violent activities that would more typically derive from vicious character traits 
(Rorty 1986, 151-6 and 162; Sparks 1997, 76 and 92-3; Scorza 2001, 639-42 and 649; 
Olsthoorn 2007, 271 and 274-6; Avramenko 2011, 23, 83-5, 114). While numerous acts 
of courage may be wholly non-violent and not at all troubling, it is concerning to have 
a virtue that is unquestionably inclusive of acts such as killing, maiming, and bombing. 
Though we can imagine scenarios where killing, maiming, and bombing could be vir-
tuous, they are typically vicious. It is worrisome, then, that we often look to such violent 
acts to best understand the virtue of courage.
A common response to this problem is to draw distinctions within courage, such as 
the oft-used distinction between martial and moral courage (Sparks 1997, 92-3; Scorza 
2001, 645; Olsthoorn 2007, 271 and 273-6; Avramenko 2011, 85-87; Zavaliy and Aris-
tidou 2014, 180-1; Kirkpatrick 2015a, 204-5; Sparrow 2015, 222-224). Martial courage 
references the notion that, within combat, courage requires the disposition to consis-
tently respond to one’s fears and face significant risk through appropriate responses, 
which often include justified force or violence. 
Moral courage is meant to serve as a contrast with martial courage. Yet, the terminol-
ogy of “moral courage” can, unfortunately, lead to some confusion. On the one hand, if 
we are discussing courage as a virtue, then “moral courage” becomes fairly redundant. 
If, on the other hand, we mean to use a broader sense of “courage” as applicable to acts 
in general, where you can be courageous while performing immoral acts, then “moral 
courage” is potentially a more useful category. While there are interesting discussions 
of moral courage in the literature (Osswald et al. 2010; Avramenko 2011, 139-190; 
Pianalto 2012), I will be discussing courage as a virtue, and so will not make use of the 
possibly redundant phrase, “moral courage.” In its place, I will use “civilian courage” 
to reference the disposition to consistently respond to one’s fears and face risk outside 
of combat, for morally permissible reasons. I will use martial and civilian courage as 
exclusive terms, though the same person can have both and exhibit them in different 
contexts (in or out of combat). 
The problem with the martial vs. civilian courage distinction is that it simply moves 
the previous worry down a level: instead of thinking that courage in general is overly 
violent, we can now pinpoint martial courage as such. After all, martial courage is now 
characterized by examples such as killing, maiming, and bombing in combat. For this 
reason, critics of martial courage see it as potentially dangerous (Rorty 1986, 151-6 and 
Rocha | Oppositional Courage
 commons.pacificu.edu/eip eP1583 | 3
170; Scorza 2001, 639-42, 646 and 649; Avramenko 2011, 85). Further, feminists worry 
that it overly embraces masculine values (Sparks 1997, 76 and 96; Scorza 2001, 638), 
while other critics emphasize the worry that it is overly violent (Rorty 1986, 151, 154-6, 
and 170; Scorza 2001, 639-42 and 649; Avramenko 2011, 83-85). Thus, martial cour-
age in particular is even harder to see as a virtue due to its seeming violent nature and 
inherent association with typically vicious acts.
I will seek to address the violence problem with a second distinction between social 
and oppositional courage. Social courage is a disposition to perform acts of courage for 
morally permissible reasons, where the determination of what counts as courageous is 
consistent with social notions of courage. Given the alignment of social courage with 
social mores and opinions, social courage is easily recognized as such. I will use “op-
positional courage” to reference a consistent disposition to act courageously for mor-
ally permissible reasons in ways that conflict with the social determination of courage. 
People with oppositional courage perform acts of courage that society deems to be 
either cowardly or rash. Since this distinction depends on social viewpoints, the same 
act can exhibit social courage in some societies and oppositional courage in others. 
Importantly, the person with oppositional courage relies on their own determination of 
what courage requires and likely receives no recognition for their courageous behavior. 
The two distinctions can overlap such that there can be, at least in theory, social/mar-
tial courage, oppositional/martial courage, social/civilian courage, and oppositional/
civilian courage.
The solution to the violence problem for martial courage lies in the key role that oppo-
sitional/martial courage plays in grounding the morality of martial courage. This point 
requires that oppositional/martial courage be possible, which may be contentious. I 
will argue that within combat situations, there can be genuine instances of courage that 
involve actions that society deems to be cowardly, such as refusing to fight. To make 
this point, I will use literary examples from William Faulkner’s A Fable and Joseph 
Heller’s Catch-22. 
I will argue that oppositional/martial courage provides a non-violent version of mar-
tial courage that is indispensable to understanding what makes martial courage into a 
reliable virtue. To make this point, I will argue that, though we usually think of martial 
courage in the social/martial sense, martial courage in fact requires an openness to 
engage in oppositional/martial courage. As a virtue, martial courage would not be used 
to serve unjust causes. Where the war is fought for a just cause using just means, social/
martial courage is likely sufficient. In the absence of a just cause, oppositional/martial 
courage is an absolute necessity: the courageous soldier would go against social expec-
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tations when society demands an unjust war. Thus, martial courage requires a vigilant 
readiness to perform acts of oppositional/martial courage. Oppositional courage then 
plays a key role in what makes martial courage count as a virtue. We understand mar-
tial courage best by examining its non-violent aspects, which lie within oppositional 
courage. 
Courage: The Core Concept
While we are not seeking a comprehensive account of courage in general, it is useful to 
begin with a rough sense of the courage virtue. Courage, roughly, is a disposition to re-
liably act in morally permissible ways to face one’s fears, overcome obstacles, and/or ac-
cept some risk of danger, but only to the degree that it is reasonable to do these things 
given the morally permissible end one is acting for. As Aristotle noted, there are two 
vices opposed to courage: cowardice and rashness (2014, 1107a-b). To avoid rashness, 
one must avoid risking danger without good reason. To avoid cowardice, one must act 
if the purpose warrants risking the danger. That courage is a virtue does not entail that 
one is only courageous when acting as moral duty requires, but only that one cannot 
act courageously while pursuing immoral ends or acting through immoral means.
Like all virtues, the core concept of courage must be fine-tuned with reference to social 
norms and standards (Rorty 1986, 151 and 162; Sparks 1997, 96). Starting with risk, 
the amount of danger reasonable people would acceptably risk, the amount of fear a 
reasonable person would be willing to face, and the kind of obstacles that a reason-
able person would think should be surmounted are all going to vary depending on 
social/cultural norms. In societies where ghosts are generally believed to be real, it 
makes sense to fear them. In other societies, it is generally accepted that ghost fears are 
groundless. In the first society type, it would be considered rash for a person to spend 
the night in a haunted house for no good reason. In the society where it is understood 
that there are no ghosts, individuals would be considered cowardly if they failed to 
face their groundless fear of ghosts. If a person who fears ghosts in a society where it 
is known that they do not exist refuses to stay in a haunted house when there is a good 
reason to do so (say for some odd charity event), then that individual would be deemed 
to be a coward.
Where risks are accepted as real, an action qualifies as rash, courageous, or cowardly 
based on whether the payoff is worth the risk. We can determine whether courage 
requires acting by weighing the probability and severity of the risk against the probabil-
ity and value of achieving the action’s purpose; we can thus imagine a courage formula 
to judge actions against (Pianalto 2012, 170; Zavaliy and Aristidou 2014, 183). No one 
literally needs to use this courage formula, of course, for it to be useful for theoretical 
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discussion (Avramenko 2011, 59). Particular questions of courage are in part based on 
social norms insofar as risks, values, and the rough ratio between them are partially 
based on socially determined assessments. 
The core concept of courage requires that agents face risks, in spite of their fear, while 
pursuing worthwhile ends. Particular instances of courage may depend on social 
norms that help the agent to roughly determine three things: (a) the extent to which 
the risk involved is serious, (b) the extent to which the expected payoff is valuable, and 
(c) whether the answer to (b) makes the action worthwhile given the answer to (a). So-
cial courage involves accepting the social determination of (a) – (c), while oppositional 
courage involves rejecting that social determination by acting on a competing, personal 
determination of (a) – (c). 
Before getting into the two distinctions, one final note is necessary. I will be thinking of 
courage as a fairly singular virtue that can be theoretically understood in various ways. 
To be courageous requires consistently and reliably facing fears and taking on risks for 
worthwhile reasons. The distinctions we will examine simply provide different occa-
sions for being courageous. The first distinction, between martial and civilian courage, 
depends on the situation, whether in or out of combat. The second distinction depends 
on social views. The four concepts do not pick out different virtues, just different ways 
of looking at courage. 
Martial Courage and Putatively Courageous Killing
Our first courage distinction is between martial courage and civilian courage, where 
the former is courage within combat and the latter is outside of combat. Someone has 
the virtue of martial courage if they have a reliable and consistent disposition to face 
fears and take on risks within combat, where doing so is reasonable given the justice 
of their cause. The just cause condition is necessary to ensure that martial courage is 
a virtue (Avramenko 2011, 254; Simola 2015, 30; Zavaliy and Aristidou 2014, 180-1; 
Kirkpatrick 2015a, 206). Someone has civilian courage if their courageous disposition 
involves acting outside of combat. In this paper, I will concentrate on martial, not civil-
ian, courage. 
A useful entry point into the discussion of martial courage is provided by a debate 
between Jesse Kirkpatrick (2015a and 2015b) and Robert Sparrow (2015) over whether 
drone operators can have martial courage. Kirkpatrick’s (2015a and 2015b) argues that 
drone operators can achieve martial courage in spite of the fact that their risk of physi-
cal harm is minimal. The drone operators’ significant risk to psychological harm, in the 
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form of post-traumatic stress, grounds their courage (Kirkpatrick 2015a, 208-210). 
Because they are willing to operate drones to accomplish key military objectives in 
pursuit of just aims, and because doing so exposes them to significant risk of develop-
ing post-traumatic stress, the operators exhibit martial courage. 
Although Sparrow (2015) agrees with Kirkpatrick that drone operators exhibit cour-
age, he denies that their courage can be martial. In particular, Sparrow argues that 
drone operators do not kill as part of combat, but at a distance from combat (2015, 
223-4). Thus, for Sparrow, their courage cannot count, conceptually speaking, as mar-
tial: it simply fails to meet the definition since it is not part of combat. To further his 
argument, Sparrow analogizes drone operators with “medics, chaplains, and military 
psychologists,” who risk psychological harms, but lack martial courage insofar as they 
act within specific, non-combatant roles (2015, 224). Similarly, Sparrow acknowledges 
that a conscientious objector or deserter may exhibit great courage, but “it stretches 
the imagination to call this martial courage” (2015, 225). We will return to Sparrow’s 
thoughts on conscientious objectors later on. 
In response to Sparrow, Kirkpatrick agrees that combat is a necessary condition for 
martial courage, but argues that drone operators kill as part of combat (2015b, 230). 
In particular, he argues that drone operators “save lives, they kill people—sometimes 
they accidentally kill innocent people—and they do so while operating in complex 
combat environments within a military chain-of-command. This seems like combat 
and being at war to me” (2015b, 230). Thus, Kirkpatrick argues, quite persuasively, 
that drone operators act within combat, and so are eligible for martial courage, be-
cause they kill in ways that fit within a military mode of killing (to save lives, poten-
tially killing innocent people, and while operating according to the chain-in-com-
mand). Combat is necessary for courage to count as martial, and killing (in a certain 
way) is key to what it means to engage in combat. Thus, drone operators have martial 
courage for Kirkpatrick. 
Killing’s central role in martial courage, which both Kirkpatrick and Sparrow embrace, 
returns us to the violence problem. For Kirkpatrick, killing plays a fairly essential role 
in what makes drone operators courageous: “Even when the cause is just, the intention 
right, and the act is necessary, a last resort, and proportionate, taking another human’s 
life is an act that requires significant courage” (2015a, 211). For Kirkpatrick, drone 
operators exhibit martial courage in large part because their video surveillance allows 
them to experience killing in close and intimate ways that surely play a role in their 
later post-traumatic stress (2015a, 211-213). In spite of not seeing their killings as part 
of combat, Sparrow agrees that, “at least some drone operators do kill reluctantly and 
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exercise moral courage in doing so” (2015, 223). For both theorists, the act of killing is 
a positive indicator that courage is applicable. 
The problem is how intimately connected the virtue of martial courage is to an activ-
ity—killing—that is typically indicative of vice. The person who kills almost always 
exhibits vice insofar as killing almost never exhibits good, moral character. The person 
who kills typically has character flaws that led her to react rashly, give in to controlling 
passions, easily be misled, and/or fail to rationally examine preferable alternatives. The 
taking of another person’s life is incredibly difficult to justify, and the person who takes 
a life has almost always shown some vice in doing so. It is, at the very least, strange to 
have a putative virtue, such as martial courage, so strongly identified with an activity 
that almost always signals a vicious character. 
This violence problem does not necessarily undermine accounts of martial courage. It 
is not so much a knock-down objection as much as it offers a sense that there is some-
thing unintuitive about understanding a virtue through an activity that typically points 
towards viciousness. Even in the best cases, killing is a regrettable, necessary evil where 
one is required to search extremely hard for alternatives. In the worst cases, killing is a 
downright vicious act. Though this is not a knock-down objection, a different under-
standing of martial courage would be preferable. I will argue that oppositional/martial 
courage provides that preferable understanding. 
Oppositional Courage in Literature 
The second distinction, between social and oppositional courage, comes down to 
whether the agent’s courage matches social conventions or runs contrary to them. So-
cial courage is the disposition to consistently respond to one’s fears and face significant 
risk for valuable reasons, where society agrees with the individual’s determination of 
the fears, risks, and the ratio between them that marks the act as courageous. Opposi-
tional courage is the disposition to consistently respond to one’s fears and face signifi-
cant risk for valuable reasons, where society disagrees with the individual’s determina-
tion. 
Before examining this distinction, it is important to note that some theorists take moral 
courage to require acting against social norms, and so their usage is similar to how I 
use oppositional courage (Osswald et al. 2010, 150-3; Pianalto 2012, 165, 172-3). Os-
swald et al. define moral courage as “a prosocial behavior with high social costs and no 
(or rare) direct rewards for the actor” (2010, 150). Pianalto defines moral courage by 
noting that, unlike physical courage where one must face fearful objects or situations, 
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“moral courage involves facing other persons while upholding some morally motivated 
cause” (2012, 165). This facing of other persons who stand in the way of the morally 
motivated cause implies that there is “significant risk of social rejection or social death” 
(Pianalto 2012, 172). Thus, for both Osswald et al. and Pianalto, being morally coura-
geous requires going against social opinions while risking one’s own social status. 
While this way of spelling out moral courage may be useful for other purposes, it will 
not sufficiently serve the current purpose for a few reasons. Firstly, Pianalto is setting 
up a sharp contrast between physical courage, which involves standing up to objects 
or situations, and moral courage, which involves standing up to persons. Such a sharp 
distinction would not help us with our current goal of understanding martial courage 
better, since we will be interested in situations that involve both physical danger and 
social pressure. Secondly, drawing such a strong conceptual distinction risks overlook-
ing the importance of social courage. There are situations where it makes sense to say 
someone is morally courageous even while society recognizes their courage. Consider 
people who commit civil disobedience against an unpopular government. While the 
government may disagree with their stance, society generally supports the agents. 
These agents ought to count as having moral courage, but theirs is distinctly social, 
not oppositional, courage. Finally, this terminology can be misleading since a contrast 
between moral courage and courage that is socially accepted would seem to imply that 
one is only moral while acting against social norms and not while facing physical fears. 
Thus, we gain a great deal from using the oppositional vs. social courage distinction. 
A quick example will be useful. In a society that considers fighting fires to protect per-
sons and homes to be courageous, fire fighters have social courage. Suppose there were 
a society where fire-fighting technology was insufficiently safe and so it was generally 
accepted that it was rash to fight fires. Suppose further that one person decided it was 
worth the risk, and she in fact could effectively fight fires, even though no one in her 
society recognized her relevant skills. Since that society would consider her to be rash, 
she would exhibit oppositional courage: she faces her fears, risks her life, and does so 
for moral values (saving lives and properties), in spite of the fact that she is never cred-
ited with being courageous. Oppositional courage typically involves being courageous 
without any recognition. In fact, those who have oppositional courage will often be 
thought of as either rash or cowardly.
Oppositional courage differs from social courage due to the agent’s disagreement with 
society over whether the action counts as courageous. “Oppositional courage” then is 
partially defined negatively: it applies when society gets courage wrong. That means 
the individual must make her own, independent determination of what courage re-
quires, and she has to get it objectively correct in spite of her society getting it objec-
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tively wrong. The individual already has to determine if her planned action is worth the 
risk if she is prudentially rational: it would be irrational to act where you do not know 
whether you are taking risks that are not warranted by the expected payoff. Since the 
rational agent already makes this determination, we can ask whether her evaluation 
matches with her society’s. Where the agent and her society make the same determina-
tion, we can ask whether she has social courage. Where they make different determina-
tions, we can ask which one got it right. If the agent got it right, then her actions may 
exhibit oppositional courage. If she gets it wrong, and her society gets it right, or if both 
get it wrong, then the agent does not have courage in either sense. 
This analysis then depends on there being right answers, at least roughly speaking, for 
what the virtue courage requires. Where one must, with no weapons at hand, rescue a 
neighbor’s dog from an animal attack, courage would require standing up to a mouse, 
would not require standing up to a bear, and would allow for some gray area for ani-
mals that are both much scarier than a mouse and much less scary than a bear. In the 
war context, there are just and unjust causes for war. A courageous act during war re-
quires acting from the right intentions for a just cause in a permissible manner. In that 
case, the answer to what courage requires is based on what it means for intentions to be 
right, for war causes to be just, and for means to be permissible. My claim that courage 
has right answers relies on the claim that morality and justice have right answers. I can-
not here tackle those larger value theory questions. Instead, I will take for granted that 
insofar as justice and morality provide right answers, then so would courage. In that 
case, sometimes society gets courage right, sometimes the individual does, and some-
times neither does. Where society and the individual both get it right, social courage 
applies. Where the individual gets it right and the society gets it wrong, oppositional 
courage applies. This point does not imply that it is easy to tell who is right or wrong, or 
that one side is right more often than the other. It simply will not be oppositional cour-
age unless it is the precise situation where the individual is right and society is wrong.
With oppositional courage, the agent not only faces fears and takes on risks, but she 
also likely does so without any expectation for social recognition. Since her determina-
tion of what courage requires differs from her society’s, the individual should realize 
that her society is unlikely to reward her actions with praise. The person with opposi-
tional courage is not likely motivated by personal recognition: she will not be seen as a 
courageous hero and is more likely to be seen as either rash or even cowardly. 
The paradigm cases of oppositional courage in combat would be people who society 
least thinks of as courageous. I will argue that conscientious objectors and even desert-
ers can exhibit oppositional courage. Later I will argue, contrary to Sparrow, that their 
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oppositional courage is also martial courage. To make these points, I will use two 
literary examples: the corporal from William Faulkner’s A Fable and Yossarian from 
Joseph Heller’s Catch-22. 
Faulkner’s A Fable provides a thinly disguised answer to the question: What would 
happen if Jesus Christ were a 20th century soldier? Prior to the novel’s events, the cor-
poral (who like most of A Fable’s characters lacks a name) refuses to fire his weapon 
in the midst of a World War I battle. Twelve other soldiers (one of whom will betray 
him) quickly follow suit and refuse to fight, followed by their entire regiment on the 
allied side. Surprisingly, the Germans also lay down their weapons. For at least a 
day, war is brought to a halt not by the greater display of violence, but by a refusal to 
deploy violence. The corporal presents a good case of oppositional courage insofar as 
he has the courage to refuse to fight, which, socially, is almost always considered an 
act of cowardice. 
While the corporal’s actions lead to the cessation of battle, the aftermath is almost 
entirely negative. Gragnon, who is commanding the mutinying division for France, 
wants all of his soldiers shot (Faulkner 1978, 23-5). The soldiers who refused to 
fight quickly abandon the corporal—scorning and swearing at him in his jail cell 
(Faulkner 1978, 190-1). Faulkner’s larger point is not just that the corporal’s actions 
are not socially accepted as courageous, but that they cannot be seen as socially cou-
rageous within this kind of war setting. One of A Fable’s main morals is that if society 
at large—combatants and civilians alike—took the corporal’s actions to be coura-
geous, it would mean an end to war. The group commander, Lallemont, explains this 
point to Gragnon: “Let the whole vast moil and seethe of man confederate in stop-
ping wars if they wish, so long as we can prevent them learning that they have done 
so” (Faulkner 1978, 45). Lallemont accepts that acts like the corporal’s can end wars, 
but such acts become truly dangerous when people believe they have succeeded. The 
social determination of courage can be manipulated by the powers that lead soci-
ety—especially as those powers seek to infuse a patriotic fervor throughout society 
to curry the support necessary to initiate and maintain unjustified wars. When the 
social sense of courage has been manipulated to serve an unjust cause, oppositional 
courage is called for. 
Thus, Faulkner’s corporal exhibits oppositional courage insofar as he refuses to fight 
in the midst of combat. Society will not grant him recognition, but the corporal feels 
that showing the way to end war is worth the risk. The corporal’s act will earn him no 
praise as a savior, but only abandonment, betrayal, and scorn. He receives no medals, 
but only an execution. By putting down his arms and leading a mutiny that attempts 
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to stop war, the corporal exhibits oppositional courage: his courage mocks society’s 
very conception of courage, which ensures the purity of his courage. 
The corporal’s oppositional courage, as Faulkner surely would agree, is a necessary 
response to the unyielding horror of war. Through Lallemont’s opposition, Faulkner 
signals that we should start with a presumption against alleged social/martial cour-
age. Most societies contain manipulative powers that wish to convince us to go to war. 
These manipulative powers seek to reward martial courage in part because doing so is 
a major way in which they can populate armies for unjust wars. Insofar as there are a 
plethora of unjust wars throughout history, there are also countless powerful leaders 
who have propagated false notions of social/martial courage to convince people to kill 
and die for unjust causes.
The corporal, in representing an allegory for Christ’s courage, exhibits oppositional 
courage in a pure form. Captain Yossarian, from Joseph Heller’s Catch-22 represents a 
more realistic approach as he is self-involved and is only courageous to save his own 
life. Some readers have a visceral anti-Yossarian reaction to Catch-22 since he attempts 
to get out of his contractual obligation to fight in what many believe is one of the clear-
est examples of a justified war: World War II (Podhoretz 2008, 228-32). Some commen-
tators go so far as to say that the novel removes courage and noble sacrifice from the 
battlefield (Pinsker 2000, 207; Podhoretz 2008, 224-5). This point certainly applies to 
the extent that Yossarian does not qualify for social courage. Nonetheless, I will argue 
that Yossarian exhibits oppositional courage in spite of being self-interested because it 
is his life that is at stake. Yossarian has the right to decide that the war is not worth a 
greater risk of his life, and he bravely makes this determination knowing that society 
will consider him to be a coward. Thus, Yossarian shows us a more tampered down case 
of oppositional courage. 
Yossarian openly flaunts social courage by admitting that he is not facing his fear of 
death, but, instead, is running from it. Given his fear-based action, Yossarian hardly 
seems to be courageous at all. Consider Yossarian’s explanation to Major Major for why 
he does not wish to fly any more combat missions: 
“I’m afraid.”
“That’s nothing to be ashamed of,” Major Major counseled him kindly. “We’re 
all afraid.”
“I’m not ashamed,” Yossarian said. “I’m just afraid” (Heller 1999, 103). 
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Yet Yossarian is courageous: while he acts from his fear of death, he is facing his fear 
of being labeled as “cowardly.” This prevalent fear can be purposely instilled in soldiers 
to such an extent that it becomes greater than the fear of death (Olsthoorn 2007, 275; 
Avramenko 2011, 33-49). Soldiers could act from their fear of being labeled “cowardly,” 
while still accurately counting as socially courageous by facing their fear of death. Yet, 
society is less likely to recognize a soldier as courageous at all if they give into the fear 
of death even while facing the often stronger fear of being labeled a “coward.” Some-
one like Yossarian cannot achieve social courage because he is weighing the threats (of 
death and the “cowardly” label) differently than society expects them to be weighed. 
It is precisely because Yossarian weighs these threats differently than his society that 
he is eligible for oppositional courage. In fact, Yossarian is willing to do whatever it 
takes—stand up to authority, refuse orders, accept a court martial, be labeled as “cow-
ardly”—to avoid being killed in combat. The one line he draws is selling out his fellow 
soldiers, but he comes close to doing that. When Colonels Korn and Cathcart offer to 
send Yossarian home in exchange for simply liking them (which would entail endors-
ing their view that all the other men should continue flying missions) (Heller 1999, 
392), Yossarian at first agrees, even though he recognizes it would be “a pretty scummy 
trick… on the men in the squadron” (393). Yet, he doesn’t carry through on his agree-
ment, as he realizes it is “odious” (399 and 405).
Yossarian backs out of his agreement and still insists he will not fly more missions. 
Socially speaking, it is considered a low point of masculinity for a man—especially a 
soldier—to go against his word. Perhaps that is why some readers so dislike Yossarian, 
who is trying to get out of his voluntarily enlisted military service. But, as Yossarian 
explains, he made the later agreement with the Colonels “in a moment of weakness” 
because he, “was trying to save [his] life” (405). So he twice turns against his word—
both against his particular agreement to like the Colonels and against his agreement to 
serve dutifully as a bomber—which is socially unacceptable. 
Yossarian has oppositional courage because he is facing his fear of being thought of as 
cowardly due to his determination that this course of action is worthwhile, even if his 
society disapproves. He is not pure like Faulkner’s corporal since Yossarian acts coura-
geously in the face of one fear (being thought of as cowardly) for the sake of a second 
fear (of death). Even where the war is just, someone can be courageous in refusing to 
fight because it is their life they are being asked to give up. Society may make a differ-
ent determination, but Yossarian seems to be within his rights to decide he is no longer 
willing to die for the cause. 
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It is worth noting that Yossarian makes this determination after he has flown dozens 
of combat missions, during which he exhibited social/martial courage (Heller 1999, 
409). However, the Colonels regularly raise the number of missions required, for 
their own self-aggrandizement, so that it appears that Yossarian will never be allowed 
to go home. Thus, Yossarian has engaged in social/martial courage prior to deciding 
that it is not worth it to fly more combat missions. Additionally, Yossarian refuses to 
act on his fear of death if it requires doing something immoral, such as selling out his 
fellow soldiers. Thus, Yossarian’s oppositional courage is based on a fear (of death) 
that he feels is more important to avoid (though society disagrees), but he sets a 
moral limiting condition on his activity, which exhibits that his actions are virtuous. 
We then see two very different instances of oppositional courage. The corporal exhib-
its the kind that is more useful for the theoretical aims of this paper. The corporal’s 
courage involves risking his life to stop an unjust war, in spite of society’s demands 
that he keep fighting. The corporal’s oppositional courage lies in his refusal to fight in 
an unjust war, regardless of the social and physical risks to himself. Yossarian’s op-
positional courage is not about a bigger picture of whether the war is just, but about 
Yossarian’s own determination of what matters for his life. He feels he has sufficiently 
killed and risked his life for his country and now does not believe they have the right 
to ask him to do more. Since the Colonels are treating him unfairly, and Yossarian 
would not betray his fellow soldiers, his actions can still be virtuous and courageous 
even if he is primarily acting for himself. Thus, Yossarian’s oppositional courage 
involves a more routine determination of his own values, which differ from that of 
his society, and his insistence that he will act virtuously in pursuit of those values. 
Though I will use oppositional courage that is more like the corporal’s to argue for 
my points, it is important to keep in mind that Yossarian’s actions likewise exhibit 
oppositional courage.  
 
A conscientious objector, the corporal, and a potential deserter, Yossarian, can ex-
hibit oppositional courage. Courage for conscientious objectors and war deserters is 
very unlikely to be social courage since society almost always discourages such activ-
ity. Each of these literary characters refuses to fight due to values that they determine 
are more worthwhile. The corporal seeks to show the lofty moral notion that soldiers 
who have the courage not to fight can undermine war. Yossarian simply does not 
wish to die for the war. Since their reasons appear to be valid, we can see each char-
acter as exhibiting oppositional courage. The next question is whether their courage 
counts as martial courage. 
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The Oppositional Grounding of Martial Courage
It is perhaps unsurprising that conscientious objectors and even deserters can exhibit 
oppositional courage. They are almost always going against social designations of what 
courage requires, and serious moral reservations often motivate them. Sparrow ap-
pears to agree with a similar point when he says, “To become a conscientious objector 
or a deserter on moral or political grounds does, I strongly suspect, require great moral 
courage but it stretches the imagination to call this martial courage” (2015, 225).
Unfortunately, since he is addressing a different question, Sparrow says no more on 
why he thinks conscientious objectors and deserters cannot have martial courage. He 
uses these cases as supposedly obvious analogies to support his disagreement with 
Kirkpatrick. Sparrow is arguing that if Kirkpatrick were to grant martial courage to 
drone operators, he would have to likewise grant it to medics, chaplains, military 
psychologists, and even to conscientious objectors and deserters. Sparrow hopes to 
provide a clear modus tollens: clearly no one would want to grant martial courage to 
deserters, and so we should deny it to drone operators. And while it may seem that the 
best response is to question Sparrow’s conditional premise, I am, for my own purposes, 
more interested in the premise that excludes conscientious objectors and deserters 
from martial courage. 
Though Sparrow simply assumes the exclusion of conscientious objectors and desert-
ers from martial courage, we can tease out two main reasons for this exclusion. First, 
he argues that agents in these various excluded roles do not face physical harm from 
the enemy in the right sort of way (2015, 224). It is not clear, however, how far this 
first argument is meant to go since some of these roles do face physical harm from the 
enemy. Medics, for example, are often on the battlefield and may have a difficult time 
protecting themselves. Faulkner’s corporal steps out into the middle of the battlefield, 
risking that the enemy could easily shoot him. Yossarian attempts to refuse to fight, but 
resides on a military base that can be attacked. This point would not prove too much 
since Sparrow’s own cases provide counter-examples to it.
A second possible argument can be based on Sparrow’s thought that these roles do 
not involve killing the enemy in the right sort of way (2015, 224-5). In fact, Sparrow is 
somewhat open to drone operators having martial courage precisely due to the ways 
in which they do and do not kill. When drone operators kill, Sparrow initially is wor-
ried that their martial courage can be contested because their killing occurs “thousands 
of kilometers away” (223). He recognizes, though, that at least some drone operators 
struggle with killing, and Sparrow believes that their courage is “arguably distinctly 
‘martial’” (223-4). Further, when they refuse orders to kill, he again considers the pos-
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sibility that their courage is “more martial,” but then rejects this possibility because it 
would imply that conscientious objectors and deserters could count as having martial 
courage, which, to quote him again, he claims “stretches the imagination” (224-5). 
Thus, we are left unsure precisely why Sparrow denies that conscientious objectors and 
deserters can have martial courage, which makes sense given the direction of his argu-
ment. 
I would argue that conscientious objectors and deserters can indeed have martial 
courage precisely because acting within combat is constitutive of their type of courage. 
Once we see that these soldiers who refuse to fight have oppositional courage, we must 
also recognize that their courage is strictly connected to combat. The corporal liter-
ally steps onto the battlefield, risking his life, to visually lay down his arms. Although 
Yossarian’s courageous activity does not occur in the middle of combat, his courage 
primarily concerns his goal to stop flying combat missions. It would be confusing to 
describe Yossarian’s courage as civilian courage. Yossarian is courageous about not fly-
ing combat missions, the general arena where his courage takes place is the war zone, 
and he is facing the risk of being court martialed in military court, not civilian court. 
Yossarian acts within combat just as the pitcher who intentionally walks a batter acts 
within the baseball game. In neither case is the action entirely proper to the setting, 
but in both cases the improper action only makes sense within that setting. The pitcher 
cannot intentionally walk a batter outside of a baseball game. Similarly, Yossarian can-
not refuse to engage in combat outside of a combat setting. 
It is fair to label the corporal’s and Yossarian’s courage as being both oppositional and 
martial. Oppositional/martial courage is the distinct kind of courage exhibited by 
someone who acts within combat and chooses to go with their individual determina-
tion of what courage requires even when their society disagrees with them. Insofar as a 
combatant lays down arms, refuses to fight, or even deserts, that combatant has opposi-
tional/martial courage provided that she acts according to her independent determina-
tion of what courage requires and she is right even though her society disagrees with 
her. In particular, if she is fighting on the unjust side of the war, then courage requires 
her to engage in oppositional courage. The possibility of oppositional/martial courage 
in the face of potentially contributing to an unjust war helps ground the morality of 
martial courage as a virtue. 
The violence problem that made martial courage appear somewhat unintuitive as a vir-
tue is based in the fact that martial courage primarily involves acting violently in ways 
that hardly seems to befit a virtue. Oppositional/martial courage points to an entirely 
different kind of activity. While some instances of oppositional/martial courage may 
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be violent (just as some acts of social/martial courage may be non-violent), the para-
digm cases of oppositional/martial courage will involve refusing to be violent, usually 
because the person has realized either that their side of the war is unjust or that their 
current combat activity is unjust or at least not warranted. Thus, oppositional/martial 
courage often results from a determination that justice requires combat activity that is 
not actually violent, but is instead a refusal to be violent. In this way of thinking about 
oppositional/martial courage, we find a moral grounding for martial courage that is not 
based in violence or typically vicious acts. The idea is simple: an agent with true mar-
tial courage must be ready and able to exhibit oppositional/martial courage when it is 
called for. 
For the most part, we expect soldiers to exhibit social/martial courage: they are to be 
brave in combat in precisely the (violent) ways that society expects. Soldiers are to kill 
when called upon, to bomb when ordered to do so, and to be willing to die for the war’s 
just cause. Their social/martial courage is picked out by the standard things that sol-
diers are meant to do. Yet, the performance of these socially courageous acts is not suf-
ficient to determine if the soldiers have the virtue of martial courage: they have simply 
shown signs of social courage when it was called for. Where society consistently de-
mands fighting for the war regardless of whether it is just, the virtue of martial courage 
requires acting in accord with social/martial courage when fighting is in fact justified, 
and oppositional/martial courage when it is not. 
Oppositional/martial courage requires that soldiers refrain from acting in combat in 
ways that are not justified even if social expectations require continued violence to 
achieve military objectives. The two versions of martial courage act in concert—re-
quiring adaptation to match the morality of the situation. Where the war and military 
activity are thoroughly justified, then the soldier with the virtue of martial courage 
exhibits social/martial courage. When either the war or the activity is not justified, and 
yet society demands pushing ahead, then the soldier with martial courage exhibits op-
positional/martial courage. The soldier who exhibits social/martial courage when it is 
called for but cannot exhibit oppositional/martial courage when it is called for does not 
truly have the virtue of martial courage—in spite of socially appearing to have it. Such 
a soldier is willing to kill and receive social honor for doing so, but is not willing to 
refuse to kill and risk social disapprobation. A failure to follow the trail of justice with 
an activity as serious and irreversible as killing is hardly worth associating with a virtu-
ous character. Hence, martial courage requires consistency according to the standard of 
justice, which may require adaptation between social and oppositional courage. 
We can now respond to the violence problem for martial courage. If we thought some-
one had martial courage because we saw them acting in a consistently violent way, we 
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might be right, but we lack the essential information of whether the person would re-
fuse to act where their violence turned out to be wrong (even though society insisted 
it was still right). Thus, if it is merely fortunate that the soldier happens to be killing in 
a just war (they, unbeknownst to an outside observer and perhaps also to the soldier 
themselves, would also kill in an unjust war), then they do not truly have the virtue 
of martial courage. What tells us whether they merely have the appearance of martial 
courage is whether the soldier would kill in an unjust war. That is, what establishes 
true martial courage is the exhibiting of oppositional/martial courage when it is called 
for. 
Oppositional courage plays a key role in establishing why martial courage counts as a 
virtue. The soldier with martial courage exhibits oppositional/martial courage when 
called upon. Martial courage is not entirely based on acts that are routinely vicious, 
such as killing, maiming, and bombing. Instead, martial courage, deep down, is just 
as much based on the refusal to kill, maim, or bomb. Even where the refusal is not 
actually required, it is the counter-factual refusal that establishes that the soldier is 
only killing because justice absolutely requires it. Further, given the irreversible nature 
of killing, oppositional/martial courage should actually be the default. The virtuous 
agent will first seek out any acceptable alternative to killing, even at the risk of being 
considered cowardly. The virtuous agent would turn to social/martial courage and kill 
only if it were absolutely necessary. The soldier with martial courage acts based on the 
demands of justice and not for social recognition. Thus, oppositional courage provides 
key moral grounding that ensures martial courage counts as a virtue. 
Conclusion
By making two courage distinctions, we develop a better understanding of martial 
courage in general. The first distinction depends on the setting: martial courage oc-
curs within combat, while civilian courage does not. The second distinction depends 
on society’s views about courage: social courage implies an agreement between the 
individual and society, while oppositional courage occurs when the individual has a 
better determination than society does.
We saw that martial courage appears to be beset with a problem that might make us 
concerned about its status as a virtue. Namely, we understand martial courage through 
violence in general and worrisome acts in particular, such as killing, maiming, and 
bombing. This violence problem at least makes it harder to imagine martial courage as 
a virtue. Fortunately, oppositional courage provides insight into martial courage in a 
way that responds to this worry. 
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Before we could adopt that potential solution, it was necessary to show that opposi-
tional/martial courage was a possible way to think about courage. As we saw in the 
literary examples, Faulkner’s corporal and Heller’s Yossarian exhibit oppositional cour-
age insofar as they each react to war in unique ways that would make them appear to 
be cowards based solely on social determinations. Yet, their acts against war were based 
in their own personal senses of courage. Further, since their actions were based in and 
revolved around combat, I argued that it only made sense to think of them as also en-
gaging in martial courage. Thus, the two literary examples established the possibility of 
oppositional/martial courage. 
Oppositional/martial courage turns out to resolve the violence problem for martial 
courage. In particular, oppositional/martial courage is called for when either the war or 
some part of the war activity is unjust. Yet, if the war or some war activity were un-
just, then a virtuous soldier would have to engage in oppositional/martial courage and 
refuse to act unjustly when the moral stakes are as high as they are in war. True martial 
courage requires that agents engage in oppositional/martial courage when required just 
as much as it requires they engage in social/martial courage when that is required. 
Martial courage then necessitates both social and oppositional courage. We primarily 
think of martial courage in terms of its social component, which makes sense since that 
would be the location where we are following the common, social conception of war. It 
is the oppositional component, however, that ensures that the killing and similar activi-
ties are complemented with the courage not to kill even when society demands killing. 
Oppositional courage provides the moral grounding because it ensures that the soldier 
is only killing because justice absolutely calls for it, and not simply because society hon-
ors it. The soldier who has true martial courage, as a virtue, would be open to killing 
or refusing to kill, depending on what justice requires. Thus, by looking at this wider 
picture of martial courage, in a way that is inclusive of oppositional/martial courage, 
we see that martial courage may often be violent, but it also has a moral grounding that 
sometimes requires the refusal to engage in violence.
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